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1. Introdution 
 
Efficiency analysis in European banking is a well-established line of research. Studies 
in this field include Molyneux et al. (1996), Altunbas et al. (2001), Goddard et al., 
(2001), Bikker and Haaf, (2002) and Maudos et al. (2002), Schure et al. (2004), 
Barros et al. (2007) and Williams et al. (2008). Factors such as legal tradition, 
accounting conventions, regulatory structures, property rights, culture and religion 
have been suggested as possible explanations for cross-border variations in financial 
development and economic growth (Beck et al., 2003a, b; Beck and Levine, 2004; La 
Porta et al., 1997, 1998; Levine, 2003, 2004; Levine et al., 2000; Stulz and 
Williamson, 2003). In addition, market dynamics have also been considered, as bank 
profits have been found to be procyclical (Arpa et al, 2001; Bikker and Hu, 2002), 
similarly to provisions for loan losses,  which can exert a negative impact on the level 
of economic activity (see Cortavarria et al., 2000; Cavallo and Majnoni, 2002; Laeven 
and Majnoni, 2003). Another strand of literature emphasises the importance of market 
structure and bank-specific variables in explaining performance heterogeneities across 
banks. This strand developed around the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) 
paradigm and has been extended to contestable markets, firm-level efficiency and the 
roles of ownership and governance in explaining bank performance (see Berger, 1995; 
Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Bikker and Haaf, 2002; Goddard et al., 2001; Molyneux 
et al., 1996). In general, the extensive empirical evidence does not provide conclusive 
proof that bank performance is explained either by concentrated market structures and 
collusive price-setting behaviour or superior management and production techniques. 
Bank efficiency levels are found to vary widely across European banks and banking 
sectors (see Altunbaş et al., 2001; Maudos et al., 2002; Schure et al., 2004). 
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In this paper, the technical efficiency of a representative sample of European banks 
from 1993 to 2003 is analysed with a simultaneous two-stage procedure: in the first 
stage, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is used to estimate the relative efficiency 
scores ranking banks according to their efficiency (Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes, 
1978).1 In the second stage, the Simar and Wilson (2007) procedure is applied to 
bootstrap the DEA scores with a truncated regression. Using this approach enables us 
to obtain more reliable evidence compared to previous studies analysing the 
efficiency of European banks, as the Simar and Wilson (2007) procedure ensures the 
efficient estimation of the second-stage estimators, which is not a property of 
alternative methods. First, the true efficiency score θ is not observed directly but is 
empirically estimated. Thus, the usual estimation procedures that assume 
independently-distributed error terms are not valid. Second, the empirical estimates of 
the efficiency frontier are obtained based on the chosen sample of banks, thereby 
ruling out some efficiency production possibilities not observed in the sample. This 
implies that the empirical estimates of efficiency are upwardly biased (Simar and 
Wilson, 2007). Thirdly, the two-stage procedure also depends upon other explanatory 
variables, which are not taken into account in the first-stage efficiency estimation. 
This implies that the error term must be correlated with the second-stage explanatory 
variables. Fourthly, the domain of the efficient score θ  is restricted to the zero-one 
interval, which should be taken into account in the second-stage estimation (Simar 
and Wilson, 2007). The method introduced by Simar and Wilson (2007) overcomes 
these difficulties by adopting a procedure based on a double bootstrap that enables 
                                                          
1 DEA was first introduced by Farrell (1957) and then developed by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes 
(1978) as a non-parametric procedure that compares a decision unit with an efficient frontier, using 
performance indicators.  
 4
consistent inference within models, explaining efficiency scores while simultaneously 
producing standard errors and their confidence intervals. As shown by these authors, 
the alternative bootstrap procedure adopted by Xue and Harker (1999) is inconsistent. 
Moreover, the truncated bootstrapped second-stage regression proposed by Simar and 
Wilson (2007) accounts for the efficiency scores better than a Tobit model. . 
 
The layout of the paper is the following. Section 2 briefly discusses the theoretical 
literature motivating our empirical analysis. Section 3 outlines the two-stage 
procedure of Simar and Wilson (2007). Section 4 presents the empirical results. 
Section 5 draws some policy implications and concludes. 
 
2.  Theoretical Framework 
There are two main types of theoretical models providing an explanation for within-
industry variation in efficiency. The first are based on strategic-group theory (Caves 
and Porter, 1977), which explains differences in efficiency scores as being due to 
differences in the structural characteristics of units within an industry, which in turn 
lead to differences in performance. In the case of European banking, units with 
similar asset configurations pursue similar strategies, with similar results in terms of 
performance (Porter, 1979). Although there are different strategic options in different 
sectors of an industry, owing to mobility impediments, not all options are available to 
each bank, causing a spread in the efficiency scores of the banking industry. The 
second type of model adopted is the resource-based one (Barney, 1991; Rumelt, 1991; 
Wernerfelt, 1984), which justifies different efficiency scores in terms of heterogeneity 
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in resources and skills on which banks base their strategies. These may not be 
perfectly mobile across the industry, resulting in a competitive advantage for the best-
performing banks. An example of a resource is cultural tradition. 
Purchasable assets cannot be considered sources of sustainable profits. In this respect 
crucial resources are those not available in the market but rather built up and 
accumulated on the banks’ premises, their non-imitability and non-substitutability 
being dependent on the specific traits of their accumulation process. The difference in 
resources thus results in barriers to imitation (Rumelt, 1991) and in the bank 
managers’ inability to alter their accumulated stock of resources over time. Such 
unique assets account for inherently differentiated levels of efficiency, sustainable 
profits ultimately being a return on them (Teece et al., 1997).  
 
3. Empirical Methodology 
As mentioned above, we follow the two-stage approach of Simar and Wilson (2007). 
The DEA model used in the first stage of our empirical analysis is a non-parametric 
technique that allows the inclusion of multiple inputs and outputs in the production 
frontier. Following Farrell (1957), Charnes et al. (1978) first introduced the term 
“Data Envelopment Analysis” to describe a mathematical programming approach to 
estimating production frontiers and measuring efficiency relative to the frontier. 
 
Estimation of Efficiency Scores 
To estimate efficiency scores for each observation, we use a DEA estimator.  The 
DEA approach usually (but not always) assumes that all banks, or more broadly, 
decision-making units (DMUs) within a sample have access to the same technology 
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for transforming a vector of N inputs, denoted by x, into a vector of M outputs, 
denoted by y. We assume that technology can be characterised by the technology set, 
T, defined as: 
 }:),{( MNMN yproducecanxyxT ++++ ℜ∈ℜ∈ℜ×ℜ∈= .  (1) 
Moreover, we assume that standard regularity conditions of the neo-classical 
production theory hold (for details, see Färe and Primont,, 1995). Having access to the 
same technology, any of the DMUs may or may not be on the frontier; the distance of 
a particular DMU from it may depend on various factors, specific to the DMU. These 
factors may be endogenous to the DMU, such as internal economic incentives 
influenced by the ownership structure, management quality, etc., and/or exogenous, 
such as different macroeconomic and demographic conditions, government regulation 
policies, etc. The distance from the actual location of each DMU given its technology 
set T from the frontier of T is thought to represent the inefficiency of each DMU, 
caused by the DMU’s specific endogenous or exogenous factors and some 
unexplained statistical noise. Our goal is to measure such inefficiency and investigate 
its dependency on efficiency drivers. 
 
In the first stage of our analysis we estimate efficiency scores for each DMU j 
(j=1,…, n), using the Farrell/Debreu-type output-oriented technical efficiency 
measure:  
 }),(:{max),( TyxyxTE jjjj ∈= θθθ .     (2) 
In practice, T is unobserved, thus we replace it with its DEA-estimate, Tˆ :  
  :),{(ˆ MNyxT ++ ℜ×ℜ∈=  m
n
k
k
mk yyz ≥∑
=1
,   m = 1, ..., M,  i
n
k
k
ik xxz ≤∑
=1
,   
    i = 1, ..., N, 0≥kz  ,   k = 1, ... , n  }.    (3)  
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where 0≥kz   (k = 1, ... , n ) are the intensity variables over which optimisation (2) is 
made. Geometrically, Tˆ  is the smallest convex free-disposal cone (in the ),( yx -
space) that contains (or ‘envelopes’) the input-output data. For more details on DEA, 
see Fare, Grosskopf and Lovel (1994), Charnes et al. (1995), Coelli, Prasada and 
Battese (1998), Copper et al. (2000) and Thanassoulis (2001), etc. 
 
This is a consistent estimator of the unobserved true technology set T, under the 
assumption of constant returns to scale (CRS). Alternatively, non-increasing returns to 
scale (NIRS) or variable returns to scale (VRS) can be considered by adding to (3) the 
constraint 1
1
≤∑ =nk kz  or 11 =∑ =nk kz , respectively.  In this paper, we assume CRS to 
be able to discriminate better between DMUs and then analyse the returns-to-scale 
component in the second stage.  The proof of consistency also requires certain 
regularity conditions (see Kneip et al., 1998, 2003, for these conditions, the resulting 
rates of convergence and the  limiting distribution of the DEA estimator). 
 
We choose this particular efficiency measure over others for several reasons. First, it 
satisfies a set of desirable mathematical properties. These properties include various 
forms of continuity, (weak) monotonicity, commensurability, homogeneity and 
(weak) indication for all technologies satisfying certain regularity conditions (see 
Russell (1990, 1997, for details). Secondly, this measure is also relatively easy to 
compute and straightforward to interpret, and therefore the most widely adopted in 
practice. 
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The estimates of the efficiency scores, jET ˆ (j=1,…,n), obtained  by replacing T with 
Tˆ  in (2) are consistent estimates of the corresponding true efficiency scores, 
jTE (j=1,…,n) given by (2). They are bounded between unity and infinity, with unity 
representing an estimated perfect (technical or technological) efficiency score of 
100%.  On the other hand, )ˆ/1( jET  would represent the estimated relative %-level of 
the efficiency of the jth DMU (j= 1,…, n), relative to the estimated best-practice  
technology frontier, Tˆ . 
 
Regression Analysis of Determinants of Efficiency 
 
Next, following Simar and Wilson (2007), we briefly outline regression analysis for 
studying dependency between the efficiency scores and hypothesised explanatory 
variables. We assume and test the following specification: 
jjj ZaTE εδ ++= ,  j = 1, …, n      (4) 
which can be interpreted as the first-order approximation of the unknown true 
relationship.  In equation (4), a is the constant term, jε  is statistical noise, and Zj is a 
(row) vector of observation-specific variables for DMUj that we expect to affect its  
efficiency score, jTE , through the vector of parameters δ  (common for all j) that we 
need to estimate.   
 
A common practice in the DEA literature for estimating model (4) had previously 
been to employ the Tobit-estimator, until Simar and Wilson (2007) highlighted the 
limitations of such an approach. Instead, they introduced a method based on a 
truncated regression with a bootstrap and illustrated through Montecarlo experiments 
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its satisfactory performance. Here, we will employ their approach.  Specifically, 
noting that the distribution of jε  is restricted by the condition 1j ja Zε δ≥ − −  (since 
both sides of (7) are bounded by unity), we follow Simar and Wilson (2007) and 
assume that this distribution is truncated normal with zero mean (before truncation), 
unknown variance and a (left) truncation point determined by this very condition. 
Furthermore, we replace the true but unobserved regressand in (4), jTE , by its DEA 
estimate ˆ jTE .  Formally, our econometric model is given by: 
ˆ
j j jTE a Z δ ε≈ + + ,  j = 1, …, n,     (5) 
where 
),0(~ 2εσε Nj , such that 1j ja Zε δ≥ − − ,   j = 1, …, n,   (6) 
which we estimate by maximising the corresponding likelihood function, with respect 
to ),( 2εσδ , given our data. Relying on asymptotic theory, normal tables can be used to 
construct confidence intervals but more precision can be gained by using the 
bootstrap. This is particularly so because in our analysis the regressand is not an 
observed variable, but an estimate that is likely to be dependent on unobserved 
variables (see Simar and Wilson, 2007, for details). To construct the bootstrap 
confidence intervals for the estimates of the parameters ),( 2εσδ , we use a parametric 
bootstrap regression method, which incorporates information on the parametric 
structure and distributional assumption. Details of the estimation algorithm can be 
found in Simar and Wilson (2007). 
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4. Empirical Analysis 
 
Data Description and Sources 
Financial statement data for commercial banks operating in thirteen EU countries 
between 1993 and 2003 were obtained from the BankScope database. The sample 
chosen requires an explanation. We evaluate domestic and foreign bank performance; 
the latter are bank subsidiaries rather than branches.2 Prior to the creation of the 
internal market in 1993, numerous foreign branches were converted into subsidiary 
operations to take advantage of new EC directives and enable competition with 
domestic banks (European Comission, 1997). From 1993 to 2001, banks were 
exposed to European currency risks, which were eliminated for EU-owned banks 
upon the introduction of the Euro. However, other foreign banks have remained 
subject to currency risk, which could cause biased estimates of bank performance. 
These reasons explain the cut-off points used in this study, (ECB, 2004). Two main 
approaches are adopted in banking to model the frontier, the production approach and 
the intermediate approach (Sealey and Lindley, 1977). In this paper the intermediate 
approach is adopted. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: Euro million (inflation-adjusted); 1993-2003 
  Inputs Outputs 
Country Statistic Fixed  
Assets 
Variable 
 Cost 
Customer 
Loans 
Interbank 
Loans 
Securities Off-
balance-
sheet 
Austria Average 48.4 263.4 2,801.5 1,474.1 975.0 224.7 
 Std dev 224.7 1,023.6 11,275.4 5,589.0 4,171.7 1,028.7 
                                                          
2 Foreign-owned banks are classified as banks with 50% or more foreign holdings. 
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Belgium Average 263.8 1,409.8 11,154.5 5,778.7 8,771.2 46,139.8 
 Std dev 46,139.8 3,492.8 29,153.9 14,780.5 21,893.3 282,722.8 
Finland Average 401.3 1,449.1 18,860.6 4,614.4 5,350.4 6,496.0 
 Std dev 6,496.0 2,300.9 32,981.1 6,944.4 7,424.8 10,869.9 
France Average 132.9 1,064.0 6,572.4 3,745.3 4,945.4 4,781.0 
 Std dev 608.2 3,959.3 25,007.7 15,361.6 22,200.5 20,896.1 
Germany Average 105.7 724.4 6,598.4 2,153.9 3,570.8 2,312.8 
 Std dev 671.2 4,271.4 35,479.6 10,509.2 25,861.5 13,455.1 
Greece Average 211.7 768.8 4,744.8 1,717.7 3,186.4 10,748.8 
 Std dev 276.1 1,093.0 6,008.3 2,847.7 5,312.5 17,235.3 
Ireland Average 110.9 646.1 6,494.1 1,716.6 3,410.0 427.7 
 Std dev 298.3 1,268.8 14,221.9 2,543.6 8,722.9 1,079.9 
Italy Average 263.2 954.1 8,886.2 2,649.4 2,609.8 4,559.9 
 Std dev 717.6 2,625.6 25,336.7 7,497.5 7,720.2 16,170.0 
Luxembourg Average 18.5 333.6 1,061.0 2,285.5 1,271.7 602.9 
 Std dev 57.6 679.4 2,455.8 4,242.1 2,777.2 1,631.9 
Netherlands Average 427.8 2,225.9 21,960.8 4,244.4 8,303.7 7,644.1 
 Std dev 1,416.0 6,963.0 64,555.1 13,199.3 29,416.4 30,076.8 
Portugal Average 163.8 582.7 5,412.4 1,727.1 1,422.8 3,352.5 
 Std dev 271.2 855.9 9,530.9 2,349.8 2,139.4 5,919.6 
Spain Average 291.7 915.4 7,125.7 1,496.0 3,627.6 1,080.2 
 Std dev 1,076.9 3,689.9 25,144.5 5,040.5 15,462.0 3,852.8 
UK Average 581.2 1010.2 8,527.3 2,532.3 5,219.2 4,321.5 
 Std dev 1,210.4 2125.3 12,318.4 2,219.5 21,219.3 12,219.3 
 
 
 
DEA Results 
The DEA index can be calculated in several ways. Here, we estimate an output-
oriented, technically efficient (TE) DEA index, assuming that banks aim to maximise 
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the profits resulting from their activity. In this context, inputs are exogenous and 
outputs endogenous because of the competitive environment in which the units 
operate (Kumbhakar, 1987).  
 
CCR efficient score model, is probably the most widely used and best known DEA 
model. It is the DEA model that assumes constant returns to scale relationship 
between inputs and outputs. It is named following their authors, Charnes, Cooper and 
Rhodes (1978) and measures the overall efficiency for each unit, namely aggregating 
pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency into one value, Gollani and Roll (1989).  
 
The BCC efficient score model is a DEA model that assumes variable returns to scale 
between inputs and outputs. It is named following their authors, Banker, Charnes and 
Cooper (1984) and measure pure technical efficiency alone, Gollani and Roll (1989). 
The efficiency score obtained with the BCC model gives a score which is at least 
equal to the score obtained using the CCR. The scale efficiency score is obtained 
dividing the aggregate CCR score by the technical efficient BCC score, (Fare et al, 
1994). A unit is scale efficient when its size of operation is optimal. If its size is either 
reduced or increased its efficiency will drop. Assuming that pure technical efficiency 
is attributed to managerial skills, the BCC scores are interpreted as managerial skills. 
All the DEA scores used in the paper are called ratio models, because they define 
efficiency as the ratio of weighted outputs divided by the weighted inputs. They use a 
radial or proportionate measure to determine the technical efficiency. A unit’s 
technical efficiency is defined by the ratio of the distance from the origin to the 
inefficient unit, divided by the distance from the origin to the composite unit on the 
efficient frontier. 
 13
 
Variable returns-to-scale (VRS) were assumed to decompose technical efficiency into 
two different components: pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency (Fare et al, 
1994). The VRS scores measure pure technical efficiency. However, the constant 
returns-to-scale (CRS) index is composed of a non-additive combination of pure 
technical and scale efficiencies. A ratio of overall efficiency scores to pure technical 
efficiency scores provides a measurement of scale efficiency. 
 
The relative efficiency of European banks is presented in Table 2, with the banks 
aggregated by country, using a MATLAB program. 
 
Table 2: Efficiency in European Banks  
Country DEA-CCR model DEA-BCC Model Scale Efficiency 
Austria  0.951 0.958 0.993 
Belgium  0.950 0.954 0.996 
Finland  1.000 1.000 1.000 
France  0.981 1.000 0.981 
Germany  0.973 1.000 0.973 
Greece  0.958 0.972 0.986 
Ireland  0.954 0.971 0.982 
Italy  0.983 1.000 0.983 
Luxembourg  0.952 0.965 0.987 
Netherlands  0.971 0.981 0.990 
Portugal  0.975 0.982 0.993 
Spain  0.985 1.000 0.985 
UK 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Mean 0.969 0.982 0.987 
Median 0.972 0.982 0.986 
St.Dev. 0.016 0.018 0.007 
 
A number of points emerge. Firstly, consistently with previous research on European 
banking, there appear to be significant differences in efficiency among the banks 
analysed (Berger, 1995; Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Bikker and Haaf, 2002; 
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Goddard et al., 2001; Molyneux et al., 1996). Note that the DEA score is between 
zero (0%) and 1 (100%). Units with DEA scores equal to 1 (100%) are efficient. A 
unit with a score of less than 100% is relatively inefficient, e.g. a unit with a score of 
95% is only 95% as efficient as the best-performing banks. Scores are relative to the 
other units, i.e., they are not absolute. Secondly, best-practice calculations indicate 
that almost all European banks operated at a high level of pure technical efficiency in 
the period under examination.  
 
Finally, all technically efficient CRS banks are also technically efficient in VRS, 
indicating that the dominant source of efficiency is scale (Gollani and Roll, 1989). 
CRS is assumed if an increase in a unit’s input leads to a proportionate increase in its 
outputs. This means that, regardless of the scale at which the unit operates, its 
efficiency will remain unchanged, assuming its current operating practices. VRS can 
be either increasing or decreasing returns to scale. In the former case an increase in a 
unit’s inputs yields a greater than proportionate increase in its outputs; in the latter, a 
decrease in a unit’s inputs yields a lower than proportionate increase in output. The 
above evidence suggests that variable returns to scale better characterise the technical 
efficiency of European banks. 
 
Determinants of Efficiency 
In order to examine the hypothesis that the efficiency of the European banks is 
determined by different variables, we followed the two-step approach, as suggested 
by Coelli et al. (1998), estimating the regression shown below. It is recognised in the 
DEA literature that the efficiency scores obtained in the first stage are correlated with 
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the explanatory variables used in the second stage, and that the second-stage estimates 
will then be inconsistent and biased. A bootstrap procedure is needed to overcome this 
problem (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993). To this end, as explained earlier, we adopt the 
approach of Simar and Wilson (2007).  
The estimated specification is as follows, Berger and Mester (1997): 
 
titiX
titionLegalTraditiCountrytiTrendtiTrendti
,,5
,4,.3
2
,.2,.10,
εβ
βββββθ
+
+++++=
 (7) 
where θ represents the DEA-CCR model efficiency score, estimated in table 2. Trend 
is a yearly trend. Square trend is the square value of the trend. Country is a dummy 
variable, which is one for a specific European country and zero otherwise; this aims to 
capture the efficiency related to each European country. Legal tradition is a dummy 
variable which is one for countries with a specific legal tradition (English Common 
law, French Civil Code, Germanic tradition, Scandinavian tradition); this aims to 
capture efficiency orientation strategies inherent to each legal tradition. Finally, X is a 
continuous variable capturing bank characteristics (assets, loans, deposits). Following 
Simar and Wilson (2007), we employ a MATLAB program to bootstrap the 
confidence intervals, with 2000 replications. The results are presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Truncated Bootstrapped Second-Stage Regression (dependent variable: CCR 
index) 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 1.16*** 1.10*** 1.16*** 
Trend 0.11*** 0.09** 0.19*** 
Square trend -0.03*** -0.07** -0.07** 
Country 
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Austria 
0.035** 0.0044** 0.041** 
Belgium 
0.03** 0.00** 0.04** 
Finland 
0.16*** 0.13*** 0.15*** 
France 
0.01*** 0.012*** 0.02*** 
Germany 
0.06*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 
Greece 
0.02** 0.04*** 0.04*** 
Ireland 
0.03** 0.03** 0.04** 
Italy 
1.16*** 1.10*** 1.16*** 
Luxembourg 
0.11*** 0.09** 0.19*** 
Netherlands 
0.03** 0.07** 0.07** 
Portugal 
0.03** 0.03** 0.04** 
Spain 
0.05** 0.07** 0.08** 
UK 
0.12* 0.10* 0.09* 
Legal Tradition 
English Common law 
0.07*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 
French Civil Code 
0.05*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 
Germanic tradition 
0.08*** 0.07*** 0.05*** 
Scandinavian tradition 
0.05* 0.04 ⎯ 
Banks’ characteristics 
Foreign ownership 
0.07*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 
Deposits market share1 
0.23*** 0.24*** 0.25*** 
Loans market share1 
0.08*** 0.07** 0.05** 
Assets market share1 
0.02 ⎯ ⎯ 
Variance 0.03 0.03 0.04 
(1) The percentage of assets, loans and customer deposits held by the bank to the 
total amount of each variable over the period. 
***, **, * statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.     
 
Several models were estimated for comparison purposes. The results are quite robust, 
since the variables that were significant in Model 1 remained significant after 
dropping the insignificant variables.  Also, country variables all have a positive and 
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statistically significant coefficient. Legal tradition also has positive and significant 
effect in all models, with the exception of Scandinavian tradition, which is 
insignificant in Model 2. Finally, deposits’ and loans’ market share both have  
positive and significant coefficients, while assets’ market share is statistically 
insignificant.  
 
5.  Conclusions 
In this paper we have adopted the DEA two-stage model to analyse the performance 
of domestic and foreign commercial banks operating in the EU between 1993 and 
2003. The main innovation in our analysis is to apply the two-stage procedure 
proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007) to bootstrap the DEA scores. This procedure 
improves both efficiency of estimation and inference. In particular, the adoption of the 
functional form (truncated functional form) in the second stage enables consistent 
inference with models explaining efficiency scores, while simultaneously producing 
standard errors and confidence intervals for these efficiency scores. Benchmarks can 
be obtained for improving the operations of banks that perform poorly. 
Our empirical findings suggest the following: First, legal tradition and foreign 
ownership have implications for public policy. EU policymakers use deregulation to 
increase competition in the banking sector and the wider financial system: initiatives 
like the Financial Services Action Plan have encouraged a competitive and market-
based structure in the financial services industry, Claessens et al. (2001). Our results 
imply that competition can be enhanced by policies designed to increase foreign bank 
penetration, Barros et al. (2007). The evidence supports the argument that 
competitive, well-regulated markets and the promotion of private property rights and 
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contractual rights help banks to gain efficiency advantages that can be exported 
successfully Humphrey and Pulley, (1997). Therefore, EU policymakers should 
continue to implement policies that increase competition and legislate against any 
remaining legal and regulatory obstacles to competition. The projected expansion of 
US banks within the Euro Area can be expected to have a similar effect on 
competition and should also be encouraged, Berger et al. (2000).  
It also seems that location does not affect performance significantly. This is instead 
explained by bank size and the relative importance of banks’ traditional activities. 
Banks with a relatively larger share of the total deposits collected are more likely to 
perform better, as are banks with a higher percentage of loans. Moreover, the larger 
the relative size of a bank, the more likely it is to perform well. This result supports 
the conclusion of most empirical studies in banking regarding the existence of slight 
economies of scale in the banking industry, and also justifies the European 
authorities’ efforts to reinforce the bank consolidation process initiated in the early 
1990s, Williams et al. (2007). More research is needed to confirm the present results.  
. 
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